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In broadest terms, this essay is about a counter-culture of self-imposed moral and economic limits, or 
rather cultures (plural), running through and against mainstream American liberalism from the early colonial era 
down to the present, at some points more strongly than others.  At rare moments, it’s shown signs of becoming a 
dominant culture, or at least a dominant cultural imaginary: at certain points in Puritan and Quaker history, in the 
cult of republican virtue during the early national period, and most especially in such religiocentric communitarian 
movements as the Shakers and the Amish--or, for that matter, as Puritanism and Quakerism once were.
All these sects, of course, were transplanted from abroad, not native born. What I am attempting to 
describe is not a propensity unique to the United States.  Tolstoi, Gandhi, and Albert Schweitzer might all be 
worthier prototypes cases than any I’ll be examining here.  But the formation arguably has special pertinence to U. 
S. culture, which is stereotypically a culture of capitalism, consumption, of plenty, and of individual upward 
mobility, relative to most of the rest of the world.  Under such conditions the mere existence of countercultures of 
restraint take on a special interest.  As David Shi writes in the best history of national simplicity ethics to date, the 
myth of the simple life “has, in a sense, served as the nation’s conscience, reminding Americans of what the 
founders had hoped they would be and [so] providing a vivifying counterpoint to the excesses of materialist 
individualism” (278). 
1. Voluntary Simplicity Lives? 
Writing twenty years ago, Shi is unequivocally confident that “the simple life will persist both as an 
enduring myth and as an actual way of living” (279). Today some would disagree.  Not for nothing was the Bill 
Clinton era called a New Gilded Age, which the George W. Bush administration, for all its attempts to distance 
itself from its predecessor, effectively has sought to sustain with large tax cuts for the wealthy in the face of 
recession.  In recent years, US presidents have famously refrained from calling upon American citizens to accept 
restraints in their standard of living.  This has not escaped notice by Americanists.  In a recent article ironically 
titled “What Is So Bad About Being Rich?” Winfried Fluck of the Free University of Berlin contends that 
representations of wealth in U. S. fiction and film have become increasingly unabashed during the past two decades, 
indeed that the critique of “the hunger for riches” as an “adolescent wish for self-aggrandizement” that we find in (say) Howells and James “gradually loses its influence at the end of the 19th century” (61). 
Still, as ethos if not as majoritarian practice, voluntary simplicity continues to thrive.  As Shi suggests, 
the dominant culture of materialism assures both its marginalization and its persistence as a voice from the margin.  
Indeed, voluntary simplicity does a brisk business these days.  Anyone with an internet hookup and a little spare 
cash can subscribe in two or three clicks to Simple Living Magazine, or tune in to “The Simple Living Network” (at 
www.simpleliving. net) http://www.simpleliving.net)to view and order some of the many self-help manuals.  
These include, for example, The Simple Living Guide (1997) by Janet Luhrs (who also edits Simple Living 
Magazine); Duane Elgin’s Voluntary Simplicity (1981), still a popular item after almost a quarter century in print; 
Linda Breen Pierce’s A 12-Step Guide to Living Simply (2003); and Elaine St. James’s trilogy  Simplify Your Life 
(1994), Inner Simplicity (1995), and Living the Simple Life (1996)--each of which takes the form of 100 micro-
essays on topics like “Cut your grocery shopping time in half,” “Get rid of your lawn,” “Sell the damn boat,” “Take 
time to watch the sunset,” “Stop carrying a purse the size of the QE2," “Practice detaching,” “Practice dying,” 
“Saying no in the workplace,”  “Get out of relationships that don’t support you,” and so forth.
These middlebrow self-help books appeal to the sense of overload frustration in such a way as to activate 
an uplifting fantasy of total life change while holding out the promise that even itty-bitty changes (such as 
occasional sunset-watching and the smaller purse) can make your life a great deal better–and be good for the rest of 
the world as well.  “A conscious simplicity,” Elgin reassures us, “is not self-denying but life-affirming”–“not an 
‘ascetic simplicity’ [but] rather . . . an ‘aesthetic simplicity’ whereby each person considers whether his or her level 
and pattern of consumption fits with grace and integrity into the practical art of daily living on this planet” (150).
Not so, however, the book after which this talk is titled, Downwardly Mobile for Conscience Sake (1995), 
edited by Dorothy Andersen.   This is a collection of 10 autobiographical narratives of individuals and couples of 
varying ethnicities and class niches (the majority of them white and college-educated, however), all of whom have 
made stringently principled decisions, for various reasons, to limit their material needs and lifestyles insofar as 
possible.  The commonest single reason is tax resistance: wanting to fly below the Internal Revenue Service’s radar 
so that “no more of my dollars [go] to this government whose aims and purposes are so far from my own values,” 
in the words of one contributor (Epling 37).  
The most searchingly analytical essay in Downwardly Mobile is by a dropout from the professoriat named 
Charles Gray, who resolved at the age of 52 to live on what he calls the World Equity Budget, his proportional 
share of the gross world product, which he reckons at $142/ month.  This, for Gray, is what it means really to practice equality rather than just pay lip service (108).  His embracement of voluntary poverty (in the spirit of 
Gandhism and primitive Christianity) is all the more notable for his recognition that this in itself doesn’t give a 
person a one-way ticket to sainthood.  “The danger of practicing what you preach,” Gray realizes, “is that it can 
become an end in itself, a searching for personal purity or salvation” to the forgetting of the larger cause or 
movement (110).  One recalls the insight T. S. Eliot puts in the mouth of Thomas à Becket in Murder in the 
Cathedral: that “the greatest treason” is “to do the right deed for the wrong reason”  (196).  Still, Gray holds 
emphatically that downscaling at the individual level is the necessary first step to substantive life change.  “First 
change you, not the world,” as another simplicity advocate puts it (Corbett 4; emphasis added).  This is philosopher 
Bob Corbett, an academic who, the same year Gray went on his more radical World Economic Budget regime, 
chose to remain in the profession but to scale back to half time, convinced that “personal simplification, downward 
mobility, is the PRE-REQUISITE to freedom of action toward the questions of social justice” (4).
All this, however, is preamble to the main focus of my essay: episodes and figures from earlier stages of 
American modernization that have modeled and/or registered the force of the ethos of voluntary simplicity that 
persists, however diminishingly, even today.   Neither Gray nor Corbett refer directly to Henry David Thoreau.  But 
overall, Thoreau is (predictably) the canonical figure from US history most often cited by modern voluntary 
simplicity advocates. “The most conspicuous and persuasive exponent of simple living in the American experience,” 
Shi calls him (140).  The website of alibi.com features a forum called “Thoreau’s Army: Local Peace Activists 
Share Expertise on the IRS” (“Thoreau’s Army”).  On simpleliving.net’s list of recommended books, Walden 
(1854) pops up as the first featured item.  The particular edition highlighted–the last time I visited the site–is 
prefaced with an essay by Joyce Carol Oates, who locates Thoreau’s appeal in its resistance to “our own gravitation 
toward the outer, larger, fiercely competitive world of responsibility, false courage, and ‘reputation’” (xi).
2. Thoreau and the Ambiguation of the Simplicity Ethic  
The spectacle of one of the most compulsively prolific writers of our time praising in such terms the most 
exactingly re-written classic in US literary history, which took nearly a decade to complete, is bemusing testimony 
to the continuing allure of his gospel “Simplicity, simplicity, simplicity” (91) as the model for constructing an 
idealized antiself, even if not as a model for strict emulation.  On the one hand, it’s a matter of record that Thoreau 
has helped provoke a number of simplification experiments more extreme than his own: cabins in more remote 
areas, withdrawal for longer periods of time, greater austerity of life-style, etc.  This tradition was ushered in by his 
fellow Transcendentalists’ memorialization of him in extreme terms: as a “hermit and stoic,” to quote his erstwhile mentor’s famous epithets (Emerson 456), as one whose natural piety at Walden approached sainthood.1  “A holy 
man within a Hermitage,” effused his otherwise irreverent friend, poet Ellery Channing (158).  On the other hand, 
Thoreau’s example has also been invoked by a far greater number of people for whom voluntary downscaling 
clearly seems temporary and/or partial, not a secession from society at large.  As  St. James puts it in the 
Introduction to Simplify Your Life, the first book in her trilogy, “to paraphrase Henry David Thoreau, take 
advantage of the movement of the times and simplify, simplify.  And enjoy” (7).  
It’s tempting to scoff at St. James for hijacking Thoreau by giving his simplicity ethic such a hedonistic 
twist.  Yet it’s also the case that some such reading, even if not precisely hers, is truer to the spirit Walden than the 
more extreme memorializations of Thoreau as a kind of monk.  He himself stresses that simplification isn’t an end 
in itself but a means to a richer inner life and protests that he is “naturally no hermit” (140).  He stresses that his 
retreat was a temporary experiment; that one of his motivations for undertaking it was release from the grim 
dutifulness of his neighbors; that he regularly revisited town during the Walden years; that the food budget he lays 
out is ventured “rather from an economic than a dietic point of view” (61) and that the reader shouldn’t “venture to 
put my abstemiousness to the test unless he has a well-stocked larder” (61)–presumably a droll allusion to his 
various mealtime subsidies.  The only time the Walden persona pictures himself explicitly as a “hermit” (in 
dialogue with his friend the “poet,” a.k.a. Channing), he comically abandons both his deep meditation and the 
“higher law” of vegetarianism in order to go on a  fishing expedition (224).  Thus he dispenses in advance with the 
later anchoritish claims made on his behalf–or against him, by detractors seeking to reduce him to a standoffish 
misfit.
Of course, Thoreau also knew that even a short-term, controlled experiment of the kind he describes entails 
a degree of deviance and self-denial from which most people would shrink.  He knew that for a Harvard graduate in 
the mid-nineteenth century voluntarily to abandon a conventional professional path and bivouac in the woods for 
more than two years would seem in the eyes of many of his townsmen seem almost as eccentric a form of retreat 
and self-denial as if he actually had become a monk or retreated to an igloo in the Canadian arctic.   But be that as it 
may, throughout Walden, in the spirit of the hermit’s happily abandoned meditation at the start of “Brute 
Neighbors,” what especially gets stressed is the remarkable ease and pleasurable payoffs of simplification rather than 
the privations and indignities.  On this ground Gavin Jones, the leading authority in the field of literature on the 
subject of U. S. poverty discourse, chides Walden for evading the problem of poverty as an endemic social dilemma by emphasizing its “cultural and spiritual” payoff.  “When chosen freely as a way of life,” Jones writes, “poverty 
defines a state of philosophical wisdom and heightened aesthetic appreciation that focuses on the vital essence of 
existence.  But when he encounters [a bona fide pauper] like the Irish immigrant John Field, who appears trapped in 
his suffering and want, Thoreau recoils in horror” and blames the victim (Jones 772-773).
Whether this is too severe an assessment I shall take up later on.  But first let us turn to another 
equivocating discourse of simplification.
3. Woman’s Fiction and the Virtues of the Simple Life
In some respects akin, though not of course identical, to Thoreau’s interweave of the ascetic and the 
hedonistic is the motif in the paradigmatic Cinderella plot of woman’s fiction–so influentially charted by Nina 
Baym--of virtuous privation as a pathway to a higher gratification.   
Obviously the usual terms of the woman’s fiction plot at the literal level differ in some very crucial 
respects from the Thoreauvian plot.  Woman’s fiction is about finding place within the social order, not dropping 
out; and its catalytic and culminating phases are very different.  The heroine’s downward mobility is altogether 
involuntary; poverty itself is “abhorred and feared” (Baym 48); and the heroine is rewarded at the end with material 
wealth and security.  But ethically it is shown to be a good thing for her to have been so tested, to learn to 
moderate her demands on life and to control her impulses.  Baym argues convincingly that maturation rather than 
marriage is woman’s fiction’s core project: that “marriage cannot and should not be the goal toward which women 
direct themselves,” that “a commercial marriage is worse by far than a single life” (Baym 39).  And crucial to this 
maturation is the acquisition of a moral autonomy that is tested and forged in a context of privation and harsh 
judgment by one’s reference group.
Now and again classic women’s fiction even offers up some quite Thoreau-esque figures as models of 
satisfaction gleaned from austerity, such as Mrs. Vawse in Susan Warner’s Wide, Wide World, who (having outlived 
both husband and children) lives by choice, and to all appearances cheerfully, an austere and self-sufficient life in an 
isolated mountainy cottage that Ellen and Alice find rather scarily remote.  “‘She has friends that would not permit 
her to earn another sixpence if they could help it,’” Alice tells Ellen, “‘but she likes better to live as she 
does’” (Warner 197).  Surely this ancient lady’s lifestyle is not what that Ellen desires for herself, or what the novel 
desires for her, or what other domestic novelists desire for their heroines.  But far better that even for them, these 
novels imply, than self-indulgent worldly materialism. So, too, for the novel that Baym treats as the inaugural 
example of the genre, Catharine Maria Sedgwick’s A New-England Tale (1822).  If rich, benevolent, and judicious Mr. Lloyd hadn’t ever shown up, A New-England Tale implies, the protagonist Jane Elton might have lived a 
perfectly decent life as a low-wage single schoolteacher.  Far better that than life with loose-living Edward Erskine. 
  Well, how more precisely should we conceptualize the linkages, such as they are, between the hero of 
Walden and the heroines of woman’s fiction?  Two motifs seem especially germane: first, a shared ideology of 
republican simplicity, including an ideal of domestic self-sufficiency–albeit home-making gets played through very 
differently in the two cases, of course–and, second, a shared resistance to invasion of one’s personhood and to moral 
compromise of one’s integrity.2  
This second denominator takes on extra resonance insofar as the texts of women’s fiction can be understood 
as covertly grasping after a greater independence than mainstream middle-class gender expectations allow their plots 
to display.  If so, at least a dotted line if not a straight line connects figures like old Mrs. Vawse and young Jane 
Elton with post-domestic-fiction texts by women writers that indulge more openly the dream of self-sufficiency at 
the cost of standing aloof from social (including) male entanglements and material blandishments at whatever 
material cost.  One such case is the reclusive, Emily-Dickinson-like artist-figure Alicia Raymond, in Elizabeth 
Stoddard’s “Collected by a Valetudinarian” (1870) a tale that reflects women writers’ increasingly self-conscious 
identification with an ideal of high artistic vocation as the nineteenth century unfolded.  This text is singled out by 
Anne Boyd in Writing for Immortality (2004) as indicative of the high-canonical aspirations of (a certain) mid-to-
late-century generation of US women fiction writers relative to the antebellum sentimentalists.  By the terms of 
Stoddard’s tale, to maintain one’s artistic conscience intact necessitates retreat from the world.3  
A more ambitious and indeed more pertinent text is Sarah Orne Jewett’s A Country Doctor (1884), whose 
heroine Nan Prince resists her proud rich aunt’s belated but earnest pleas to abandon medicine and the single life for 
a comfortable urban marriage with the aunt’s protégé, a young lawyer who adores Nan.  (The elder Miss Prince is an 
intriguing composite of the traditional roles of wicked stepmother and fairy godmother.)  Nan also turns down more 
prestigious professional paths than the one on which she settles for conscience’s sake.   “More than one 
appointment had been offered [her] in the city hospitals,” says the narrator, where a worldly success would have 
been assured (Jewett 364), but she refuses these to remain loyally in her home village with her aging guardian and 
mentor Dr. Leslie.  Although  Stoddard was the more admiring reader of Walden, A Country Doctor actually makes 
the better matched pair because of its more explicit critique of heteronormativity, its explicit brief for the necessity of following one’s vocation, and its fuller articulation of Nan’s choice of country village life over upscale urban life.
But probably neither the would-be artist nor the would-be doctor would have been reckoned such defining 
images of  virtuous voluntary female downscaling from the perspective of turn-of-the-century readers as the urban 
charity worker–a figure embodied most famously by the urban settlement house pioneer, activist, and (later) Nobel 
Peace Prize laureate Jane Addams.  This brings me, at last, to Wharton’s House of Mirth  (1905), a novel written in 
the midst of the two decades of social work encapsulated by Addams in her memoir Twenty Years at Hull-House 
(1910).  
4. Conscienceful Downward Mobility in Old New York
Elaine Showalter argues that House of Mirth undoes woman’s fiction by reprising the scenario of the 
orphaned protagonist forced into dependency on the good will of a nasty imperious aunt as a tragic naturalist plot in 
which the heroine goes down to defeat and death amidst a toxic culture of female relationships that are “distant, 
formal, competitive, even hostile” and maternity and childbirth are “banished to the margins” (Showalter 362-363).  
There’s much truth to this judgment of the particular niche into which Lily is born and hopes to ensconce herself, 
even though the sweeping claim about female culture doesn’t hold at all for the one woman of Lily’s caste who opts 
for an unfashionable lifestyle of do-gooding: Gerty Farish.  But the omission is understandable enough, considering 
how both Lily and to some extent even the narrative voice itself types Gerty as a different and inferior species of 
being, living “‘in a horrid little place, [with] no maid, and such queer things to eat’” (Wharton 8).
Such is Lily’s snide encapsulation of Gerty in Chapter 1, which groups Lily in a triad with the two 
characters in her set who model quite different styles of voluntary restraint: Gerty, who isn’t literally there but is 
dissected in absentia, and her cousin Selden, to whose apartment Lily has indiscreetly repaired.  Selden and Gerty 
are both smitten by her in ways that differ according to the split they exemplify between the hedonistic and self-
denying facets of voluntary simplicity that the Thoreau persona conflates. 
Selden lives a basically contented and tasteful life within his means, voyeuristically relishing exquisite 
objects he knows he can’t afford (like Lily) and consoling himself with the high-minded notion of his spiritual 
independence in his self-styled republic of the spirit, even as the novel makes clear that his drive to remain part of 
the world of high fashion is hardly less strong than Lily’s. Gerty, for her part, lives by choice more frugally and 
less tastefully than she can afford, channeling her inherent good-heartedness into helping less fortunate women, 
eventually including also Lily–although Gerty too remains bonded to the meretricious upper crust (“a parasite in the 
moral order, living on the crumbs of other tables,” the narrator rather mean-spiritedly calls her) (118)--tied there by her fund-raising efforts, her crush on Selden, and her gratitude at being admitted to elite social gatherings.  
Lily’s self-positioning in relation to both Selden and Gerty follows from her status as “the victim of the 
civilization which had produced her,” as Selden silently sums her up in the first chapter (8).  Between the two styles 
of quasi-contrarianism Selden and Gerty represent, his sophisticated self-containment is predictably the one that 
attracts Lily.  Gerty’s path she also recognizes to be a possible escape route from marriage with the Percy Gryces of 
the world; but she recoils in disgust at the prospect of commiting herself to it.  (“No; she was not made for mean 
and shabby surroundings, for the squalid compromises of poverty.  Her whole being dilated in an atmosphere of 
luxury” [23], she thinks early on.)   Later, Lily does nonetheless fitfully try out the charity option, even to the point 
of starting to see the lower class “victims of fate” not just as a mass but as “bundles of feeling . . . clothed in 
shapes not so unlike her own” (119).  But though she briefly opens herself up to Gerty and then to Nettie Struther, 
the working woman she once helped, it is clear all along that these worlds will never be hers–and what’s more, the 
novel suggests, that’s that’s just as well.  The narrative voice itself satirizes both those kindly women for well-
meaning denseness, with an extra swipe at Gerty for her pathetic jealousy of Selden’s attraction to Lily.
As such, House of Mirth might be read as a kind of retort in advance to Jane Addams’s brief for “The 
Subjective Necessity of Social Settlements,” showcased in Twenty Years at Hull-House (68-76).  “We have in 
America,” Addams writes, “a fast-growing number of cultivated young people who have no recognized outlet for 
their active faculties,” whose “uselessness hangs about them heavily” (71).  Addams could have been talking about 
Lily Bart, or about Nan Prince’s well-bred but rudderless would-be fiancé in A Country Doctor.  Addams’ call to 
such folk is essentially the call of Social Gospel progressivism to “share the lives of the poor,” to “make social 
service . . . express the spirit of Christ” (73).  Yet such appeals the fictive world of House of Mirth has scant 
patience for.  Although Maureen Howard rightly characterizes Gerty Farish as the kind of person who might well 
“have been in the audience when Jane Addams lectured, making a point of the social responsibility which must be 
assumed by the fortunate” (149-150), not even Gerty goes so far as to live in a settlement house.  Nor are her 
pitches in the least degree religiously inflected.  Indeed the whole idea of genteel charity workers’ identification with 
the poor is more satirized in House of Mirth than sympathized with.
On the other hand, and by the same token, House of Mirth and Hull-House are clearly products of the 
Social Gospel moment: the compassionate discovery of the poor, particularly the urban poor, by the rich, 
particularly by the first sizeable generation of women of education in search of a worthwhile independent vocation.  
For one thing, there never was a writer more self-consciously adept at satirizing the self-deceptions of genteel do-gooding social workers than Addams herself (with considerably greater subtlety than Wharton, in fact), to the point 
that it sometimes seems that Addams takes less pleasure in reporting her team’s accomplishments than in 
humiliations like Tolstoi’s criticism of her absentee landlordism and expensive clothing (Addams 156-57) or the 
Hull-Housers’ failure to create nice “young people’s clubs” (79) for the urban poor that would compete with the 
allure of saloons. Throughout Addams’s autobiographical writing, the discourse of high-minded progressive reform 
unfolds symbiotically with a discourse of self-parody, a bit reminiscent in this respect of Transcendentalist 
discourse, as when Thoreau follows his screed on “Economy” with Thomas Carew’s poem on “The Pretensions of 
Poverty.”  But regarding Wharton per se, the point I would stress especially for present purposes is that Lily Bart in 
her own irregular way does, in fact, choose downward mobility for conscience’s sake, even if not quite so 
emphatically as Addams or even Gerty did.  Although Lily’s decision to forego profit from the Dorset letters was 
hardly disinterested given her crush on Selden, the fact that she burns her trump card instead of playing it is shown 
unequivocally to be a fine and noble thing.  This makes for an even more striking contrast between the often 
compared suicide denouements of House of Mirth and Theodore Dreiser’s Sister Carrie than Wharton’s ambiguation 
of the question of whether Lily really wanted to make away with herself.  
5. The Upshot
Amy Blair’s recent article “Misreading The House of Mirth” argues that many of the novel’s 
contemporaneous readers insisted on identifying with idealized images of Lily that they constructed for themselves: 
with Lily as a “surrogate for the upwardly mobile reader” (154), a tragic example of a perfectly proper aspiration.  
Maybe so.  But just what is the “proper aspiration” that Lily’s trajectory represents?  Read through the lens of 
voluntary simplicity discourses, Lily emerges as the figure in the novel who comes closest to addressing–however 
partially and belatedly–the core social problem that Wharton insisted to at least two of her friends, including 
William Roscoe Thayer in a letter of 11 November 1905, was at the heart of the novel’s project, namely that “fewer 
responsibilities attach to money with us [Americans] than in other societies” (262).  From this standpoint, House of 
Mirth looks not so much like the undoing of woman’s fiction as its continuation in at least two key respects, and of 
Thoreauvian simplicity discourse as well.  First, House of Mirth also defines virtuous restraint as the basis of right 
conduct over against a society valuing material advancement. Virtuous self-privation trumps conscienceless 
affluence.  Second, it distinguishes aesthetically compelling modes of material self-restraint from squalid ones.  
Readerly identification with Lily’s final self-denial, certainly to Selden and likely to most readers also, depends in 
no small measure on its refinement and dignity–and so too with Nan Prince, with Jane Elton, with Mrs. Vawse, and with Henry Thoreau.  
This brings me back to Gavin Jones’s critique.   Can dramatization of the virtues of restraint as aesthetic 
appealing avoid suppressing or at least marginalizing the hard realities of poverty?   I have six short reflections to 
offer in response.  First: admittedly it can’t–at least not altogether.  Jones is absolutely right about that.  But 
second, this downside hardly delegitimates the project of dramatizing the positive virtues of antimaterialism.  
Which would be more likely to tolerate uncritically a culture of capitalist exploitation: an ethos of material 
aggrandizement, or an ethos that set a high value on personal limits and restraint?  The answer seems obvious.  
Third, simplicity discourse often–if not always–does involve wrestling with the nightmare of real poverty. Jones 
himself intimates this vis-à-vis Lily Bart.  Her story revolves “around poverty as [both] an ontological [and] an 
economic category” (779).  Lily’s “old incurable dread of discomfort and poverty” (Wharton 231), permanently 
implanted in her by the ruin of her family fortunes during her adolescence, is basic to her psychic makeup from start 
to finish. This makes that final renunciation of hers more poignant and consequential: the fact that Lily knows in 
her bones, even if she hasn’t had before to face the prospect with such stark directness,  what it means to live and 
die poor.  I’d also be prepared to make a version of the same claim in the case of both Thoreau and woman’s fiction 
protagonists.  Consider for example Thoreau’s combination of hauteur toward and implicit identification with his 
community’s marginal others, such as woodchopper Alex Thieren and bogtrotter John Field, who become de facto 
doubles of his own marginalized condition even as he tries to draw a line between his condition and theirs. 
Fourth, to make converts, voluntary simplicity discourse must depend at least partly on appeal to the 
pleasures as well as the rigor and nobility of downsizing.  The admonition “Take up your cross and follow me,” 
alone, isn’t likely to do the trick for more than a very few.  So fifth, and conversely, then, the resultant compromise 
strategy on which most calls, as well as most responses to calls, to voluntary simplicity rest–the argument that 
material self-restraint is a win-win proposition that promises to make you happier and benefit the world at the same 
time)–that strategy explains both why simplicity countercultures might persist even in a climate of hegemonic 
materialism and why the consciences even of those devotees who are saints compared to the average run of humanity 
(like Jane Addams and ex-professor Gray) can never be at peace.   For these noble individuals will always be sizing 
up the actual practice of voluntary simplicity in awareness of how easy it is to settle for what Christian ethicist and 
German resistance martyr Dietrich Bonhoeffer called “cheap grace,” that is the sensation or proffer of redemption that 
does not exact a true discipleship of “renunciation” and “self-effacement” (46-47).4  Sixth and finally, then, as Thoreau says of economy, so I would  say of voluntary simplicity discourse: this is “a subject which admits of 
being treated with levity, but it cannot so be disposed of” (Thoreau 29).  It admits of being treated skeptically as a 
bourgeois mystification of individual autonomy complicit with capitalism, but the troubled conscience that gets 
activated to set itself against hegemonic materialism cannot and should not be so disposed of–provided, that is, that 
it continues to make trouble for itself as well as for its readers. 
  Notes
1. Emerson’s qualifying amplification is no less important, however” “hermit and stoic as he was, he was really 
fond of sympathy, and threw himself heartily into the company of young people whom he loved” (456).
2.  See Anderson for a discussion of Walden in the context of a broader argument for the centrality of domestic 
rhetoric in American male as well as female writing from John Winthrop through the nineteenth century (72-86).
3. See Boyd 87-90.  See also Thomas Wentworth Higginson’s letter to his wife after visiting the Dickinson 
household: “If you had read Mrs. Stoddard’s novels you could understand a house where each member runs his or 
her own selves” (473).
4. For Bonhoeffer, “grace” has meaning only in an evangelical Christian context.   Works Cited
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